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Abstract 
Kant’s concept of grace in Religion within the Bounds of Mere Reason is a difficult topic, 
exegetically speaking. Obviously enough, Kant subscribes positively to a notion of divine 
assistance. This appears awkward given his rationalist ethics rooted in personal autonomy. This has 
given cause to interpreters of Kant’s philosophy of religion – both early commentators and today – 
to read Kant’s account of grace is uniquely rationalist. This would make grace a rational 
expectation given personal commitment to good works. The argument of this paper is that grace is 
a hyperrationalist element in Kant’s practical philosophy because of the potentially problematic 
consequences of Kant’s views of human nature. Human nature is namely not particularly prone to 
be responsive to the rational moral law and therefore requires a number of pedagogical tools that 
facilitate moral agency. 
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Shortly after the publication of Kant’s Religion within the Bounds of Mere Reason in 1793, 
Gottlob Christian Storr (1746-1805) published his notes in Tübingen on Kant’s work as 
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Annotationes quaedam theologicae ad philosophicam Kantii de religione doctrinam1. Kant 
planned a reply to Storr but never explicitly delivered on this (6:13). Storr was a 
conservative theologian that taught at the universities of Tübingen and Stuttgart. He was 
highly influential at the Tübinger Stift, which was a prominent Evangelical college of 
residence and study which housed many important thinkers of the 19th century such as 
Friedrich Hölderlin (1770–1843), Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831), Friedrich 
Wilhelm Joseph Schelling (1775–1854), Ferdinand Christian Baur (1792–1860) and David 
Friedrich Strauß (1808–1874). It is no overstatement to say that these individuals were 
among the most influential of the early 19th century, and all of these were, directly or 
indirectly, educated by Storr with regard to Kant’s philosophy of religion. Storr was an 
opponent of rationalism and the Enlightenment, which makes it little surprise that he was 
highly critical of Kant’s views of rational religion. Storr read Kant’s Religion as an attempt 
to interpret (Christian) religion rationally in order to expose a rational truth at the bottom 
of Scripture. This way of reading Kant’s Religion will be engaged in this essay, 
specifically on the subject of Kant’s philosophical view of grace (Gnade). In short, I will 
argue that Kant comes upon a notion of grace in relationship to his moral philosophy, but 
that this concept of grace is a response to certain pedagogical difficulties relating to a level 
of irrationalism in human beings. Consequently, Kant upholds a level of irrationalism in 
grace in order to respond to a certain irrationalism in human beings. Certain aspects of 
Kant’s philosophy of religion can then rightly be read as the progenitor of more Romantic 
views of religion (e.g. later Schelling, Schopenhauer and Schleiermacher). 
But this argument equally implies that a reductively rationalist reading of Kant’s 
philosophy of religion is mistaken because it misses the pedagogical purposes behind 
rational religion. As any educator will tell you, educating people is about working with 
some of the more messy aspects of human beings and not really about determinatively 
overcoming those aspects. This pedagogical function of religion for Kant has been missed 
because a certain reading, influenced by Storr, which was common in the first half of the 
19th century and remains influential today, especially since Allen Wood’s Kant’s Moral 
Religion (1970)2. Its dominance in the early 19th century can be illustrated by means of a 
similar reading of Kant’s philosophy of religion in the work of both Arthur Schopenhauer 
(1788-1860) and his personal arch-nemesis Hegel. Schopenhauer distinguishes between 
two types of metaphysics, namely philosophy and religion. The former is a rational system 
of thought that has its justification in itself and can be true literally; the latter is a doctrine 
based upon a revealed truth that can, at best, be true allegorically. The two of these ought 
not go over into one another: one should not make a religion rational and neither should 
                                                             
1 References to Kant’s works follow the Akademie Ausgabe. I provide the number of the volume followed by 
the page. Translations are taken from Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant. For full references, 
see bibliography. 
2 After Wood, questions were raised whether or not Kant’s position in Religion is consistent with regard to 
critical philosophy as detailed in the three Critiques and even whether Religion is self-consistent. Gordon 
Michalson famously locates a number of ‘wobbly’ aspects of Kant’s views of religion that are self-
contradictory and at times self-defeating (Michalson 1990 and 1999). For a defense of the consistency of 
Kant’s Religion: Palmquist 2000; Firestone and Jacobs 2008). 
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one make philosophy religious. Kant’s rational religion is then a potentially dangerous 
mixing of philosophy and religion: “So-called philosophy of religion, which, as a kind of 
Gnostic wisdom, attempts to interpret given religions and to explain what is true sensu 
allegorico through something that is true sensu proprio” (Schopenhauer 2011, p. 191 
[185]). This is dangerous because “the attempt to found a religion on reason displaces it 
into the other class of metaphysics, into that which has its validation in itself, thus onto 
foreign soil” (ibid.). One should not lay a new foundation for a house that is already 
erected. This is the first part of a twofold objection Schopenhauer voices against rational 
religion. The second part of this objection is that when one nevertheless lays a rational 
foundation for religion one is at risk of mitigating or even removing those elements of 
(Christian) doctrine that are the most compelling. Christianity has an appeal just because it 
is irrational or hyperrational. Specifically, Schopenhauer is considering the doctrines of 
original sin and justification through grace – which obviously are two fairly enigmatic, 
perhaps even irrational, elements in Christian religion. This is likely the real reason why 
Schopenhauer opposes rationalism in religion: “The [rationalists] seek to interpret away 
[hinauszuexegesieren] everything specifically Christian; thereby they retain something that 
is not true either sensu proprio or sensu allegorico, but rather a mere platitude, virtually 
Judaism, or at most shallow pelagianism, and, worst of all, base optimism that is entirely 
foreign to Christianity proper” (ibid., p. 191 [184]).  
The second part of Schopenhauer’s objection closely approximates Hegel’s 
objection to rational religion. In his Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion of 1827, Hegel 
is worried that certain processes in natural and historical science, even in philosophy 
proper, could impede a proper, dialectical approach to religion. This is a twofold process: 
on the one hand, philosophy only allows religion the content “that the natural light of 
reason could supply regarding God” and, on the other hand, philosophy interprets religious 
doctrine with regard to their immanent, rational usefulness (Hegel 2007, p. 156 [66]). 
Hegel finds especially this latter aspect highly problematic since, through this process, 
“Christ is dragged down to the level of human affairs, not to the level of the commonplace 
but still to that of the human, into the sphere of a mode of action of which pagans such as 
Socrates have also been capable” (ibid., p. 156 [67]). Hegel is particularly worried that the 
dialectical essence of the Christian notions of revelation and incarnation would be 
relegated to mere triviality through rationalizing religion – a worry that anticipates 
Kierkegaard’s Existentialism. 
 Neither Schopenhauer nor Hegel mention Kant explicitly when they criticize a 
rationalized version of religion. In both cases, this likely stems from the honest respect 
they felt was due to the Königsberg philosopher. What should nevertheless be surmised 
from this is that Kant’s very project of a rational religion was criticized by both Hegel and 
Schopenhauer for removing the heart and blood out of (Christian) religion. This complaint 
continues on after Kant and remains the standard objection to Kant’s Religionsphilosophie. 
While there certainly is a distance between Kant’s rational religion and Christianity, the 
view that Kant provides a wholly rationalized version of religion is an overstatement in 
need of nuance. Kant retained the honesty to see the gaps in rationality and a such 
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uncovered the need for something of an irrationalism, even though he sought to address 
this darkness ultimately by means of the architectonics of reason. This is generally true for 
many central topics in Kant’s philosophy of religion such as radical evil, Christology and 
Ecclesiology. All of these are at danger of being read as uniquely rationalistic but their 
function within a broader architectonic system of practical morality notwithstanding, they 
remain at root responses to an irrational need for something beyond rationality. In 
providing a response to these deeper layers, Kant recognized that rationality by itself does 
not suffice for human agents. 
 The present contribution will explore how this general strategy is developed with 
regard to Kant’s notion of grace. The general point will be that there is an irrationalist 
element to Kantian grace because of a threefold consideration: grace is a pedagogical tool 
that responds to an underlying layer of moral pessimism; in order to fulfill this function, 
grace must necessarily consist of certain irrational elements; the pedagogical merit of grace 
is that it regulates and assuages moral pessimism without dismantling the ground of 
pessimism. As such, Kant’s grace is not totally and reductively rationalist but – not 
because of any Christian inspiration, as some would say – in certain interesting parts 
hyperrationalist. If Kant would have provided a purely rationalized concept of grace, he 
would likely arrive at some sort of a Pelegian concept of grace that connects human effort 
directly to justification through grace. Through a reading of the three difficulties with 
respect to the moral ideal in Religion II, I have previously argued that Kant does not totally 
subscribe to a Pelegian point of view when it comes to grace (Vanden Auweele 2014)3. 
Presently, the focus will be on the so-called antinomy of faith (6:116-124), which will be 
interpreted by means of relevant sections of the ‘Doctrine of Method’ in the Critique of 
Practical Reason and certain of Kant’s historical/anthropological writings. 
 
The Project of Rational Religion 
  
Kant’s overall project in Religion is twofold, namely to provide a transcendental deduction 
of the elements of pure rational religion and to test whether or not Christian religion is in 
tune with these elements. Traditionally, this twofold project was illustrated by drawing a 
distinction between ‘two experiments’ in Kant’s Religion, a reading guide which Kant 
clarifies in the second preface (added in 1794 in order to clarify the purpose of his work). 
The first experiment must necessarily “abstract from all experience” (6:12) and reflect on 
how “morality thus inevitably leads to religion” (6:6). The second experiment then takes 
                                                             
3 Here, I argued that scholars have generally suggested that Kant either gave a Humanist reinterpretation of 
Christianity or that Kant was really a closeted atheist. More recently, a new wave of so-called affirmative 
Kantians aimed to show that there is no fundamental split between Kant’s views of religion and Christianity 
(e.g. Stephen Palmquist, Chris Firestone, Nathan Jacobs). My view is that while Kant might have been 
influenced by a Lutheran-Pietist view of Christian religion, his views on religion in Religion do not interpret 
Christianity in any way. Instead, Kant aims to provide a transcendental ground for religion (which is then 
‘rational religion’) which can be clothed in historical garments (which is then ‘historical religion’) in order to 
countenance the possible despair that can ensue from the ready recognition of the fallibility of human 
capacities and the strenuous demands of the moral law. 
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this one step further and proceeds by holding “fragments of [some alleged] revelation, as a 
historical system, up to moral concepts, and see whether it does not lead back to the same 
pure rational system of religion” (6:12).  
Whether or not Kant actually intended two experiments has recently received some 
controversy. Lawrence Pasternack offered a new perspective on this by pointing out that 
Kant never explicitly intended such a twofold experiment. His mentioning of a ‘second 
experiment’ (Versuch) merely signals that he will make a second attempt (Versuch 
translates naturally as attempt) at testing whether Christian religion is rational (Pasternack 
2017). Most of the time when Kant mentions Versuch, Kant is merely alluding to 
‘attempts’, but, at some times, it gets a more technical meaning closely associated with 
‘experiment’. For instance: “Now yet another experiment [Versuch] remains open to us: 
namely, whether pure reason is also to be found in practical use […]” (A804/B832). At any 
rate, while one could quibble endlessly about the proper translation and terminology, this 
point does not touch the hermeneutical strategy in Religion which clearly has the twofold 
project of delineating rational religion and testing whether Christianity is a rational 
religion. 
Without clearly distinguishing between this twofold project, a number of 
misunderstandings might arise. In their discussion of the second preface, for instance, two 
seminal studies of Religion miss the difference between Kant’s two projects: Jean-Louis 
Bruch discusses only Kant’s insistence that one should not be familiar with his ethical 
writings and Josef Bohatec focuses solely on Kant’s suggested unity between Christianity 
and rational religion (Bruch 1968, pp. 21-22; Bohatec 1966, pp. 34-35). More recently, 
some commentators believe that Kant’s chief concern in Religion is to translate Christian 
concepts into concepts that may be beneficial for morality and Kant has, therefore, little to 
no interest in traditional and historical Christianity (Ward 1972, pp. 150-170; Reardon 
1988; Hare 1996). Alternatively, some scholars read Kant as providing a revisionary 
reading of Christian religion: Giovanni Sala argues that Kant’s religion is “a critical 
revision of one positive, historical religion: Christianity” (Sala 2000, p. 9 – my translation) 
and Stephen Crites believes that Religion’s “four parts offer strictly moral interpretations 
of original sin, Christology, the coming Kingdom of God […], and a doctrine of the 
church” (Crites 2012, p. 550). Stephen Palmquist, Gordon Michalson and Lawrence 
Pasternack (at one time) offer, however, interesting discussions of both experiments and 
show what exactly the effect is of that classical Kant scholarship missed this twofold 
project (Palmquist 2000, pp. 128-135; Michalson 1979, pp. 56-57; Pasternack 2014, pp. 6-
9). While originally it was thought that Kant achieved the first experiment in his writings 
on ethics in the 1780s, the consensus now seems to be that the experiments appear 
throughout Religion – even though there is some discussion where exactly. In my view, if 
Kant wants to be successful in showing that Christianity is a rational religion, he first has 
to establish the a priori necessary essence of a rational religion. This is what Kant calls the 
‘inner circle’ of religion, namely the bare essence of religion as such. Only after having 
done so, Kant can indeed investigate whether or not Christianity as a historical aligns well 
with the pure essence of religion. 
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This twofold purpose of Religion provides a vital reading guide into Kant’s 
purposes throughout this book. His aim is not to interpret Christianity (or any other faith) 
but to deduce the rational necessity of religion transcendentally and only after having 
established such a universal, merely formal essence of religion, he will explore whether 
Christianity in fact accords to pure rational religion. In a manner of speaking, after 
conceptualizing the naked (blos) body of religion, he investigates whether the historical 
garments of Christianity best flatter its essential, inner essence. While Kant clearly believes 
that there is essential unity between rational religion and Christianity, he does warn that 
certain historical evolutions in Christianity have not been true to its essential message. This 
means that Christianity is essentially a rational religion, but that certain interpretations of 
Christianity have broken away from this essence. Kant’s aim is then to propose certain 
reforms in historical Christianity that would purify Christianity of any elements that 
conflict with the essence of rational religion. Religion I is concerned mainly with the 
appropriate view of human nature and its natural disposition towards the moral law. Here, 
Kant argues that humanity is predisposed originally to be good in terms of giving priority 
to the moral law over its inclinations towards self-love, but humanity has inexplicably 
fallen from this original goodness and now has incurred a propensity towards evil. In 
Religion II, Kant is concerned with the individual’s way of recovering from this evil 
nature. An individual can do so by adopting the good Gesinnung, namely the strong 
decision, conviction or disposition to persevere in progressing towards moral goodness. A 
Christian can be strengthened in doing so by the moral example of the Son of God, which 
“enables him to believe and self-assuredly trust that he, under similar temptations and 
afflictions (so far as these are made the touchstone of that idea), would steadfastly cling to 
the prototype of humanity and follow this prototype’s example in loyal emulation” (6:62). 
Religion III is then concerned with how a society as a whole can progress morally. Here, 
Kant clearly believes that a merely political community cannot promote moral progress 
because such a community, on the one hand, aims at promoting legality, not morality and, 
on the other hand, does not have a legislator that can scrutinize the human heart. Instead, 
an ethical community, or a church, is best equipped to promote moral progress in 
humanity.  
 As illustrated above, there are two aspects to any authentic religion, namely its 
rational essence and its historical form. For Kant, it is a lamentable but “unavoidable 
limitation of human reason”  that a “historical faith attaches itself to pure religion” (6:115). 
Human beings do not live merely in the abstract but they formulate, in accordance with 
certain historically-contingent beliefs and superstitions, certain concrete aspects of being 
religious. This means that certain not-necessarily-rational elements naturally latch unto to 
religion as such. To illustrate, a rational religion promotes the idea of a moral ideal, which 
is a ‘son of God’ that sets a moral example to follow. While Kant never mentions Jesus 
Christ by name, the Christian Messiah is a good example of the rational ideal of moral 
perfection. The possible reason why Kant foregoes from naming Jesus Christ likely is 
related to his general objective to undo religion of its unnecessary elements. Whether or 
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not this ‘son of God’ has any specific characteristics such as a name, a place of birth, a 
heritage, certain bodily features or has any of the specifics of any life, is ultimately of very 
little concern. In a letter to Jacobi at one point, Kant clarifies that what is most important in 
the idea of a ‘son of God’ is the universal, ahistorical idea of Christ, while the Evangelical 
or historical account – or even the historical origin of that idea – is a side-issue 
(Nebensache) of little relevance (11:76). Indeed, the specifics of the moral example only 
serve to distract or even impede its moral function for Kant. For instance, the adulation of 
Jesus Christ could lead towards the idea that Christ is operative in the human agent’s 
salvation, thereby downplaying the extend of humanity’s autonomous moral duty4. 
 This is why Kant suggests a twofold strategy of dealing with the historical garments 
of religion: on the one hand, (Christian) faith is to be reformed so that the historical aspects 
are in tune with rational religion and, on the other hand, (Christian) faith is to progress on 
the path of becoming “pure religious faith until finally we can dispense of that vehicle” 
(6:115). This means that Christianity is to be aligned with rational religion for the time that 
the historical garments remain a necessary commodity for believers who need historical 
mediation for rational religion.  It is doubtful whether Kant actually believed that such a 
state could in fact be reached. At one point, Kant expresses the hope that  
 
historical faith, which, as ecclesiastical, needs a holy book to guide human beings but, 
precisely for this reason, hinders the church’s unity and universality, will itself cease and 
pass over into a pure religious faith which illumines whole world equally; and we should 
diligently work for it even now, through the continuous development of the pure religion of 
reason out of its present still indispensable shell (6:135n). 
 
Kant added to this, in the second edition of Religion, that his hope is that historical faith 
“can cease” and not that it “will cease” (Ibid.). As such, he clearly believes that human 
nature might be too fragile ever completely to dispense of historical faith, but that 
historical faith itself should be of such a nature that it naturally relegates itself to the pure 
religion of reason. 
 This general strategy might incline a reading of Kant’s philosophy of religion 
wherein any elements of historical faith that are not purely rational are to be dismissed. 
This does not seem to be the case, however. The idea that historical religion has to be 
aligned with the rational essence of religion, does not imply that such a historical religion 
has to be entirely rational. In fact, certain functions of rational religion require a reference 
to something irrational, and certain irrationalist elements of religion cannot be abandoned. 
This topic is most explicitly addressed when Kant discusses topics that border on pure 
rational religion, but do not entirely belong to the inner circle of religion. In other words, 
these are elements of historical religion that are necessary elements of rational religion. 
These are indeed rather awkward and are prone to give rise to charges of inconsistency in 
Kant’s Religion. What is to be made of religion’s irrational aspects that necessarily belong 
to rational religion? The ambivalence of this topic explains Kant’s own hesitations when 
                                                             
4 For further discussion of this topic: Pasternack 2012, pp. 30-52; Palmquist 2012, pp. 421-437. 
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discussing the parerga to rational faith, namely effects of grace, miracles, mysteries and 
means of grace. Kant’s introduction of these is telling:  
These are, as it were, parerga to religion within the boundaries of pure [reinen] reason; 
they do not belong within it yet border on it [stoßen doch an sie an]. Reason, conscious of 
its impotence [Unvermögens] to satisfy its moral needs, extends itself to extravagant ideas 
[überschwenglichen Ideen] which might make up for this lack, though it is not suited to this 
enlarged domain. Reason does not contest the possibility or actuality of the objects of these 
ideas; it just cannot incorporate them into its maxims of thought and action (6:52). 
 
Two of the terms in this quote are of particular importance, namely ‘impotence’ and 
‘extravagant ideas’. The original German terms have been provided because translation is 
key. Especially the adjective in the latter term is subject to controversy. It is variously 
translated as ‘extravagant’ (Di Giovanni), ‘high-flown’ (Greene and Hudson) or 
‘boundless’ (Palmquist). The connotation in the German original suggests that the ideas are 
excessive and therefore unnerving at the same time. While one would expect this to carry a 
negative connotation in Kant’s rational religion, these ‘extravagant’ ideas are introduced 
by Kant as necessary bordering concepts of rational religion that do not wholly belong to 
the inner sphere of religion, but without which rational religion cannot function. This 
already signals that there is a necessary addendum to rational religion which leads to some 
more high-flown, extravagant or boundless ideas. Grace is one of these. 
 
Moral Service and Grace 
 
The specifics of a rational religion of reason ought to be specified further in order to better 
understand the irrationalist elements in a proper understanding of grace. While one could 
make this argument from the difficulties relating to Kant’s Christology in Religion II, we 
will focus on the ‘antinomy of faith’ in Religion III. Kant sets the stage by making a 
distinction between a ‘saving faith’ (seligmachende Glaube) and a ‘slavish faith’ 
(gottesdienstliche Glaube). The former is based upon morality, the latter is based on cultic 
service to God (6:115-116). This means that the former aims to instill a disposition of 
dutiful morality while the latter promotes the idea that one can be saved through certain 
amoral (or even immoral!) services to a deity:  
 
The one faith fancies to please God through actions (of cultus) which (though laborious) 
yet possess no moral worth in themselves, hence are actions extracted only though fear or 
hope, the kind which also an evil human being can perform, whereas for that the other faith 
presupposes as necessary a morally good disposition (6:115-116). 
 
Any reader familiar with Kant’s writings on morality would naturally assume that a 
‘saving faith’ is occupied solely with good life conduct. According to Groundwork and the 
second Critique, a moral agent acts out of respect (Achtung) for a self-prescribed, 
autonomous moral duty. While these duties derive from the self-legislation of noumenal 
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rationality, the human agent is allowed to perceive “all moral duties as divine commands” 
in order to add to the psychological appeal of these duties (5:129; 6:230). But Kant’s point 
in Religion goes beyond his point in second Critique (and third Critique), namely in 
pointing out how a saving faith necessarily has another component next to autonomy, 
namely grace. A saving faith promotes, on the one hand, good life conduct in order to be 
well-pleasing to God and, on the other hand, a faith in satisfaction or justification insofar 
as one exhausts one’s capacities. The two belong together necessarily, which means that a 
saving faith cannot dispense of either autonomy or grace.  
 This sudden and somewhat unexpected point appears paradoxical and Kant does 
not lack the honesty to recognize that this is a “remarkable antinomy of human reason” 
(6:116). This antinomy wonders whether or not historical faith is “an essential portion of 
saving faith” (Ibid.). While at first seemingly unrelated to the question of the relationship 
between grace and autonomy, this antinomy goes to the heart of a troubling paradox in 
Kantian philosophy. The paradox reads as follows. On the one hand, Kant allies to a strong 
interpretation of human depravity. When Kant describes his moral anthropology and the 
reach of human depravity in Religion I, he seems more of the mindset of Luther than 
Erasmus in their famous debate on the freedom of the will5. Depravity does not touch the 
autonomy of the human power of choice, but it does deprive human beings of a natural 
incentive towards the moral law. Luther would say that the human being is nothing but 
Flesh, while Erasmus argued that human nature remains in some ways redolent of original 
goodness. This means that morality is superimposed upon human nature and does not 
emerge from human nature. In Kantian language, there is no sensible hospitality to the 
moral law: “There is no antecedent feeling in the subject that would be attuned to morality: 
that is impossible, since all feeling is sensible whereas the incentive of the moral 
disposition must be free from any sensible condition” (5:75). The moral law and our 
incentive to respond to that law (respect) is superimposed through noumenal rationality 
and is not born from human nature. This way of thinking about the relationship between 
human nature and the moral law does, in turn, explain why morality remains always a duty, 
rather than an inclination. Through lacking a natural incentive towards morality, the 
interest in morality is generated in the confrontation with the moral law. Luther would 
similarly point out that human beings are only informed and interested in God and morality 
through revelation, not through their nature.  
This radical interpretation of human, natural depravity is one side of the coin. On 
the other hand, Kant emphasizes that moral duties are duties of autonomy for which any 
individual is uniquely responsible. Human beings are the first and only protagonists in their 
justification and salvation. As such, Kant seems to be leaning in the direction of a Pelagian 
concept of soteriology wherein good works by themselves suffice for justification. 
Fleshing out the purpose of grace in this soteriology is key to understanding properly 
Kant’s rational religion. 
                                                             
5 For an extensive discussion of this claim: Vanden Auweele 2013, pp. 117-134. 
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 The tension between both sides of the coin was signaled powerfully by Gordon 
Michalson, who notes how Kant’s account of depravity “appears to force him in an 
Augustinian direction, while his conception of grace or divine aid reintroduces an 
obviously Pelagian element based on human effort and merit. The resulting position […] is 
not so much incoherent as it is unstable” (Michalson 1990, p. 97). While Michalson’s 
observation is astute, there is a more charitable reading possible of the interplay between 
grace and good works in Kant’s philosophy. This reading suggests that one must 
necessarily model Kant’s language of grace within the strictures of his pessimistic view of 
human nature. Many commentators fall in either of the following pitfalls. Either one 
stresses the decisive role of moral works and then relegates Kant to a Pelagian6 or one 
stresses the profound challenge radical evil poses to Kant’s ethics and one is consequently 
is forced to read his account as more or less Christian, i.e. not (entirely) based on merit7. 
 Kant addresses this tension explicitly in the remarkable antinomy of reason – 
sometimes called the ‘antinomy of faith’ – in Religion III (6:116-123). An antinomy is a 
conflict of reason with itself because of two propositions that appear equally plausible but 
mutually exclude one another. On the one hand, Kant argues that “the pure moral faith 
must take precedence over the ecclesiastical” (6:117). This means that the necessary 
condition under which ecclesiastical faith might take positive effect is good life conduct. 
Kant’s argument for this position is a contrario, namely that no rational human being 
could consent to the view that he merely has “to believe the news of a satisfaction having 
been rendered to him, and (as the jurists say) accept it utiliter, in order to regard his guilt as 
done away with” (6:116). To Kant, it appears genuinely absurd that a human being that has 
not made moral progress by himself could believe that good life conduct would be “the 
unavoidable consequence of his faith and his acceptance of the proffered belief” (6:117). 
To put it bluntly, this would be a grace without merit. On the other hand, Kant argues that 
“faith in a merit which is not [the believer’s] own, but through which he is reconciled with 
God, would therefore have to precede any striving for good works” (6:117). This is so 
because insofar as man is conscious of the fact of his bondage to the evil principle (the 
Hang zum Böse), he is without “capacity in him sufficient to improve things in the future” 
(6:117). If a human being would have any hope of being justified before God and for the 
first time capable of good life conduct, then something must happen that is necessarily 
outside of the capacity of the depraved human being. 
  This is the antinomy of faith: does good life conduct necessarily precede faith or 
does faith necessarily precede good life conduct? With the exception of the mathematical 
antinomy in the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant’s default solution when faced with an 
antinomy consists in validating both sides of the equation from different points of view. 
These points of view are the phenomenal and noumenal perspective. The ultimate 
                                                             
6 Numerous authors have made this claim in some way, including Barth 1969, p. 187; Wood 1970, p. 197n. 
Bohatec 1966, p. 337; Michalson 1990, p. 76. Others have emphasized that Kant’s soteriology is a ‘light’ 
version of Pelegianism: Byrne 2007, pp. 139–52; Bruch 1968, p. 105n. 
7 This point is made, in very different ways, by these authors: Pasternack 2012; Palmquist 2010; Firestone 
and Jacobs 2008; Mariña 1997; Hare 1996. 
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argument is then that good life conduct and faith basically boil down to the same thing. 
The effect of faith in the Son of God is good life conduct: 
 
The living faith in the [archetype] of a humanity well-pleasing to God (the Son of God) 
refers, in itself, to a moral idea of reason, insofar as the latter serves for us not only as a 
guideline but as incentive as well; it is, therefore, all the same whether I start out form it (as 
rational faith) or from the principle of good life conduct (6:119). 
 
Insofar as the archetype of moral perfection appears in empirical form, what Kant calls the 
‘God-man’ but most Christians naturally think of Jesus Christ, there can be somewhat of a 
distance between faith in the example (Vorbild) of the archetype (Urbild). This is due to a 
tendency in human beings to elevate the clothing of religion over its rational message. 
Therefore, human beings come up with various amoral ways of paying homage to the God-
man by which they become so-called true followers. Indeed, Kant recognizes that “it is 
arduous to be a good servant (here one always hears only talk of duties); hence the human 
being would rather be a favorite” (6:200). In turn, this also explains Kant’s sincere 
hesitations with regard to historical faith since this is the ground and cause of significant 
moral waywardness. Therefore, Kant expresses the hope that in the end religion “will 
gradually be freed of all empirical grounds of determination” (6:121). Authentic religion, 
however, emphasizes good life conduct as the only means of becoming pleasing to God. 
On this, Kant is categorical: 
 
There is no other means (nor can there be any) by which to become worthy of heavenly 
assistance, except the earnest endeavor to improve his moral nature in all possible ways, 
thereby making himself capable of receiving a nature fully fit – as is not in his power – for 
divine approval, since the expected divine assistance itself has only his morality for its aim 
(6:192). 
 
As such, for a rational religion the idea of the God-man (the example of a ‘Son of God’), 
simply serves to reinforce moral motivation. This means that faith in grace is ultimately 
equal to a tool that empowers moral courage, nothing more. 
 
Grace and Moral Pedagogy 
 
In order to unpack and clarify Kant’s very dense argument with regard to faith in grace in 
Religion III, it is vital to address the overarching purpose of his philosophy of religion. Up 
to this point, Kant has recognized that (1) morality necessarily extends towards a pure 
rational religion, (2) human beings require rational religion to be clothed into a historical 
faith, (3) authentic historical faith in attuned to pure rational religion, (4) the cause of 
moral waywardness can often be attributed to elevating historical faith over rational 
religion and (5) faith in the Son of God is a companion to good life conduct. 
 From the above, it should be clear – especially from point (2) and (5) – that rational 
religion necessarily extends to certain not purely rational notions, mostly because of 
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human finitude. This means that it is concern for some of the unique characteristics of 
human beings that forces Kant to supplement pure practical morality with, what Robert 
Louden calls, an ‘impure ethics’ (Louden 2000). These are then concerns for, broadly 
speaking, human education – or, as it would be called in the 19th century, Bildung 
(cultivation). The primary figures of inspiration of this new view of education (closely 
associated with Romanticism) were Kant and Rousseau. Through some of their 
innovations, children were no longer perceived as ‘savages in need of culture’ (against 
which Rousseau could be taken to argue) or ‘blank slates’ (against which Kant could be 
taken to argue). Instead, educational institutions progressively realized that students had a 
remarkable level of autonomy that ought to be nourished appropriately. The task of 
education was not to use the same standard for every individual but to cultivate their inner 
potential. Indeed, while the traditional way of thinking about education as Erziehung 
implicated the student only as the receptacle of instruction, the new idea of Bildung could 
only be achieved through the participation of the student. While Herder, Schiller and 
Goethe were among the major figures who propagated this new ideal approach to 
education, the figure most readily associated with this new innovation is Wilhelm von 
Humboldt (even though Humboldt’s writings on education were only published some time 
after his death). Gradually, education was less concerned with imparting knowledge as 
such, but rather with edifying and cultivating character.  
 This new approach to education that will become increasingly influential 
throughout the 19th century was foreshadowed by some of Kant’s insights into education. 
In the ‘Doctrine of Method of Pure Practical Reason’ of the second Critique, Kant 
addresses an issue he had without success addressed in Groundwork III, namely “the way 
in which one can provide the laws of pure practical reason with access to the human mind 
and influence on its maxims, that is, the way in which one can make objectively practical 
reason subjectively practical as well” (5:151). By this issue, Kant does not mean to take 
back any of his rigor in arguing for rational respect as the only genuinely moral incentive. 
Instead, Kant ponders how “pure virtue can have more power over the human mind […] 
than all the deceptive allurements of enjoyment” (5:151). Human beings are imperfect and 
embodied rational agents that require assistance in building up to pure morality. Kant even 
goes so far as to suggest that “a mind that is still uncultivated or one that is degraded onto 
the track of the morally good” might need “some preparatory guidance” (5:152). This 
initial guidance can even consist of immoral practices – such as the treat of harm as 
motivators for proper legal agency – as long as these practices lead human beings to a 
legally proper course of action. When human beings are accustomed, however, to the legal 
proper course of action, then the pure moral incentive must be brought forward. As such, 
Kant recognizes that the human agent that is averse to pure morality will never be 
convinced by an appeal to rationality alone. These amoral and immoral practices that 
would promote legality can enlighten human beings about their own dignity, and so 
provide the resources to “tear himself away from all sensible attachments so far as they 
want to rule over him and to find a rich compensation for the sacrifice he makes in the 
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independence of his rational nature and the greatness of soul to which he sees that he is 
called” (5:152). In an Aristotelian spirit, Kant would even recommend habituation to moral 
virtue (5:154). 
 This point of view is confirmed by the Lectures on Pedagogy (9:486-499), but Kant 
draws up a slightly more nuanced view of moral education in the ‘Doctrine of the Methods 
of Ethics’ in the Metaphysics of Morals. Here, Kant distinguishes between a moral 
catechism and a moral ascetics/gymnatiscs. The former is a Socratic conversation wherein 
the educator awakens the student to the proper propositions and content of practical reason; 
the latter is the whole of practices, symbols and ideas that aim to promote a mindset 
wherein one is capable of “combatting natural impulses sufficiently to be able to master 
them when a situation comes up in which they threaten morality; hence it makes one 
valiant and cheerful in the consciousness of one’s restored freedom” (6:487). In slightly 
less Kantian terminology, one aspect of moral education aims at instilling moral courage 
wherein one is trained to remain upright when faced with adversity. 
 Kant signals clearly that his concern with rational religion and especially the 
concept of grace is one of education, specifically moral gymnastics. Nearing the close of 
Religion I, Kant has built up to a remarkable tension between human capacities and the 
extent of human duties. Slightly bombastically, Kant suggest that how “a naturally evil 
human being should make himself into a good human being surpasses every concept of 
ours. For how can an evil tree bear good fruit?” (6:44-45). Since the propensity to evil 
reaches into the roots (radix) of human volition, one cannot expect this tree to bear good 
fruits. Therefore, Kant notes that a certain germ of goodness must remain in the human 
being that would lead him to moral betterment, which is the predisposition to goodness. 
But this moral betterment cannot happen through gradual improvement! Instead, this must 
be a “revolution in the disposition of the human being” (6:47). Elsewhere, Kant similarly 
emphasizes that “the end of religious instruction must be to make us other human beings 
and not merely better human beings” (7:54). Whether or not this revolution has taken place 
necessarily remains inscrutable since we lack introspection8. Therefore, human beings 
must be jolted into exhausting their own capacities in order to reform their propensity to 
evil. 
 At this critical juncture of Kant’s argument, Kant divulges that the essence of 
rational religion and the concept of grace is moral education (Bildung): “From this it 
follows that a human being’s moral education [Bildung] must begin, not with an 
improvement of mores, but with the transformation of his attitude of mind and the 
                                                             
8 E.g.: “The depths of the human heart are unfathomable [unergründlich]. Who knows himself well enough 
to say, when he feels the incentive to fulfill his duty, whether it proceeds entirely from the representation of 
the law or whether there are not many other sensible impulses contributing to it that look to one’s advantage 
(or to avoiding what is detrimental) and that, in other circumstances, could just as well serve vice?“ (6:447) 
or in Religion as: “Assurance of this [making moral progress] cannot of course be attained by the human 
being naturally, neither via immediate consciousness nor via the evidence of the life he has hitherto led, for 
the depths of his own heart (the subjective first ground of his maxims) are to him inscrutable” (6:51); 
“Indeed, even a human being’s inner experience of himself does not allow him so to fathom the depths of his 
heart as to be able to attain, through self-observation, an entirely reliable cognition of the basis of the maxims 
which he professes, and of their purity and stability“ (6:63). 
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establishment of a character” (6:48; see also 8:116). This means that moral education does 
not attack individual vices, but provides a character that remains upright in the face of 
temptation, not by ousting temptation, but rather by cultivating a character that is valiant in 
the face of temptation. In a nutshell, this is what has been described above a moral 
gymnastics, which is a process that necessarily extends to impure, irrational (sometimes 
even immoral) practices in order to appropriately facilitate moral courage.  
The downside of this argument is that these practices – some religious, some 
secular – are not embraced for their truthfulness, rather for their beneficial effect. As Allen 
Wood has shown, Kantian moral faith is a lot like Pascal’s wager since it does not “try to 
show that Christianity is true, but that Christian belief would be advantageous to have” 
(Wood 1970, pp. 160-161). Pascal, however, recognized the limits of such a prudential 
embrace of Christian faith. In fact, Pascal knew that prudential considerations do not sway 
the unbeliever’s heart. When one has recognized the intellectual merit of Christian faith, 
one must debase (abêtir) oneself through ritual practice in order to render the mind porous 
to Christian faith. As did the Jesuits of Pascal’s day believe, the practice of ritual repetition 
can incite one to forget the prudential reason for turning to Christian faith and make one a 
true believer. Kant does not assign such redemptive qualities to ritual repetition. Instead, 
Kant merely points out the benefits of an embrace of Christian religion without providing 
any overriding reasons to convince the unbeliever – with the possible exception that 
atheism might remove certain incentives to progress morally (5:453).  
A related downside to Kant’s argument is that religious notions and practices, such 
as grace but others can be included as well, lose their uniqueness and become replaceable9. 
This means that there might be other, non-religious practices that can equally serve the 
purpose of encouraging moral courage, through which religion would become a 
replaceable assistant to morality. Two examples can be helpful. First, Kant points out in a 
number of places that a proper civil constitution can induce moral behavior: “The good 
moral education (Bildung) is to be expected from a good state constitution” (ZeF 8:366). 
While a good constitution cannot provide the motivation for moral agency (which can only 
be rational respect), such a constitution can assist in making moral behavior easier. A civil 
society in which all sorts of vices are permitted or even encouraged would indeed make 
morality far more difficult. Second, the beautiful in art can be a symbol for morality 
(5:351-354). Moral goodness and beauty are similar since, like the moral law, the beautiful 
legislates for itself: the beautiful is what announces itself spontaneously, rather than 
conforming to a prior concept of the beautiful. Through exposure to the beautiful, the 
moral fiber of human beings can be strengthened. Indeed, when one inhabits a world that is 
beautiful, that beauty can make one more like to act morally. In criminological theory, this 
is confirmed by the so-called ‘Broken windows-theory’, which suggests that criminal and 
antisocial behavior is reinforced by an urban situation full of disorder and vandalism10. 
                                                             
9 This was one of the main reasons why theologians objected to Kant’s philosophy of religion in the 19th 
century. For an overview: : Zachhuber 2013. 
10 The theory is based upon the following article: Wilson and Kelling 1982. 
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This theory was put to the test in, among others, New York in the late 80s and proved 
effective: crime declined after a serious investment in public works fixed broken windows, 
removed graffiti, etc. Kant’s aesthetics suggests something similar: legal and moral 
behavior is facilitated by the experience of the beautiful.11 These points show that an 
authentically moral religion, a proper civil constitution and a beautiful environment are not 
strictly speaking moral, but can facilitate moral behavior. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Kant’s philosophy of religion tries to deal with the mess that is humanity. Human beings 
are naturally ill-disposed towards morality, which makes its necessary that they receive 
some sort of pedagogical, preparatory guidance in becoming moral agents. The ready 
recognition of the fallibility of moral pursuits – not in the least because of the demanding 
nature of the moral law – can incline moral despair. In order to counteract such moral 
despair, Kant recognized that human beings require certain practices that can appeal and 
cultivate moral courage in the face of potential despair. Kantian hope counteracts despair.  
 This means that religion has its ground in something that is not purely rational. In 
fact, religion emerges in response to those elements in humanity that would object to 
rationality. There is an extralogical component to human beings, conceptualized by Kant in 
his Hang zum Böse, that necessitates the appeal to something beyond rationality. While 
this is not the place to make such sweeping claims, such a reading of Kant’s philosophy of 
religion could clarify how certain aspects of Romantic philosophy have decisive Kantian 
pedigree. For instance, Schopenhauer’s pessimism might then be an enlarging mirror for 
Kant’s great discovery that human being intimately rebel against rationality.12 
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